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Contemporary Discussions on Religious  
Minorities in Islam 
Jorgen S. Nielsen∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most public debate on Islam today, as it takes place outside the 
Muslim world proper, is locked into views of Islam in its traditional 
medieval forms and in particular those specific aspects and forms of 
expression which have attracted the attention of centuries of observa-
tion and scholarship. This is not the place to engage again in regret-
ting the impact of medieval European misunderstandings of Islam 
and the Muslim world1 or in attacking “Orientalism.”2 It is enough 
to recognize that such traditional approaches have had a substantial 
effect on public debate concerning the contemporary Muslim world. 
Indeed, the position of religious minorities in Islam is one of the 
topics that has been especially prone to being locked into a tradi-
tional view. This traditional view of Islam has found renewed vigor 
in the public debate about Islam after September 11. I intend in this 
paper to point out some of the alternative views which are gaining 
ground, especially in the Arab world, and give an indication of some 
of the contextual processes which are supporting them, as a coun-
terweight to the strength of the traditional views, in the hope that 
this might contribute to a more differentiated image of a religion 
and culture which is much more complex than is popularly supposed. 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Islamic Studies and Director, Center for the Study of Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations, Department of Theology, University of Birmingham, U.K. Email: 
j.s.nielsen@bham.ac.uk. The initial research for this paper was conducted during an extended 
visit to Lebanon and Jordan in the Summer of 1995, funded in part by the British Academy. 
 1. These are surveyed in their complexity by scholarly works such as NORMAN DANIEL, 
ISLAM AND THE WEST: THE MAKING OF AN IMAGE (1993); MAXINE RODINSON, EUROPE 
AND THE MYSTIQUE OF ISLAM (Roger Veinus trans., 1988); and ALBERT HOURANI, ISLAM IN 
EUROPEAN THOUGHT 7–60 (1991). 
 2. See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). For a sympathetically critical 
response, see BOBBY S. SAYYID, A FUNDAMENTAL FEAR: EUROCENTRISM AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF ISLAMISM, ch. 2 (1997). 
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Much of the early European scholarship in the field of Islam re-
lied heavily on the classical Islamic legal textbooks.3 One major prob-
lem with this scholarship is that it assumed such law was also descrip-
tive. While these assumptions about law had also characterized a 
phase of European historiography, the historians were able to correct 
their assumptions by referring to the data in diplomatic and judicial 
archives. Scholars of Islam and the Middle East were much slower to 
adopt these methods of the European and North American histori-
ans4 for two main reasons: first, their training long remained isolated 
from the mainstream of history as a discipline, and second, because 
the Islamic and Middle Eastern archives, necessary for a study of how 
the law was implemented and how it impacted society, have only re-
cently become accessible.5 
Modern historiography is not the only discipline that has influ-
enced Islamic scholarship; the questions and methodologies of the 
social sciences have also opened up new vistas. For example, the 
work of social anthropologists has exposed the distance between the 
norms of the Shari’ah and the practice of local communities. In addi-
tion, legal anthropology and the recently popular field of the study 
of fatawa (legal opinions) have shown how the local upholders of 
the Shari’ah, the Islamic qadis (judges), often bridged the gap be-
tween the normative rules of the Shari’ah and the practical require-
ments of the local communities.6 
 
 3. One of the best single accounts to come out of this tradition is that of Antoine Fat-
tal who presents a systematic analysis of the position of the minorities protected by the contract 
of dhimmah. The outlines of this account were already established in the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad and were elaborated over subsequent generations until the subject was incorpo-
rated into classical normative textbooks. 
 4. Indeed, this is one of Said’s complaints against the orientalists. 
 5. A vast amount of literature based on court archives and registries has appeared in 
recent years. An already classical work of this nature based on even older archival materials, 
namely 5 S.D. GOITEIN, A MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY: THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF THE 
ARAB WORLD AS PORTRAYED IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CAIRO GENIZA (1967), was a sig-
nificant factor in the disillusion with legal texts as a reliable source for social realities. 
 6. A good example of this is offered in LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989). See also KEMAL CICEK, Living To-
gether: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eighteenth-Century Cyprus as Reflected by the Shari’a 
Court Records, 4 ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 36–64 (1993). 
NIE-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:24 PM 
353] Religious Minorities in Islam 
 355 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Explaining Present Perceptions of Islam 
1. The development and influences of Islamic scholarship 
Simplistic views of Islamic law, rooted in out-of-date scholarship, 
have been reinforced by developments in the Muslim world itself. 
Islamist political movements have tended to attract most attention 
when they have expounded those traditional rules of Shari’ah such as 
the death penalty for apostasy and adultery, harsh punishments for 
certain other crimes, and oppression of women and non-Muslims. 
The Taliban in Afghanistan is another obvious example. The West 
has gradually accepted such rules and traditions as “typical” of the 
Islamic world. 
However, the “typical” image outlined above is only partially ac-
curate and ignores the extraordinarily complex predicament of the 
Islamic scholarly disciplines over the last century or so. The rise of 
European economic and political power during the nineteenth cen-
tury had deep repercussions in the Muslim Middle East even before 
many regions fell under direct colonial rule. The shift of educational 
models from that of the madrasa-university to that of Oxford, Cam-
bridge, and the Sorbonne accompanied the rise of new forms of em-
ployment in civil and military state structures. New professions and 
specialties associated with modernization and the gradual integration 
of local and regional economies into global networks attracted grow-
ing numbers of people and resources away from the systems and in-
stitutions of Islamic education. New specialist colleges, military and 
civilian, became the ideal destinations for ambitious young men, and 
the American University of Beirut became the desired alternative to 
Al-Azhar, the thousand-year-old Islamic university in Cairo. 
The result of these changes was the decimation of the Islamically 
literate elite (ulama) and a consequent decline in comprehension of 
the complexities of the Islamic legal tradition. At the same time, 
pressures for reform, especially in family law, came to be associated 
with pressures for westernization, leading many Islamic scholars and 
activists to reject all reform as a surrender to the imperialists. What 
was left in the broader Muslim public opinion was a merely superfi-
cial comprehension of the rules of the Shari’ah partnered by com-
plete ignorance of its subtleties, of its scope for flexibility in imple-
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mentation, and of the centrality of the rules of interpretation. At the 
same time, the available trained personnel with the full range of tra-
ditional skills and knowledge was sharply reduced in number. So 
when, for example, President Jaafar al-Numeiri of Sudan made Is-
lamic law the norm in his country, citizens had only a superficial 
knowledge of it and committed quite blatant mistakes. 
2. Islamic constitutions 
Western perceptions of human rights in the Muslim world are in-
fluenced by traditional views of Islamic thinking, by the practice of 
states in the region, and often by a confusion of the two. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that very few Muslim countries claim to have an 
Islamic constitution. Some of the Muslim countries that do claim to 
have an Islamic constitution are Iran, Afghanistan, Libya, Saudi Ara-
bia, one or two Gulf States, and possibly Morocco. However, these 
countries lack a full consensus of Islamic opinion inside and outside 
their own countries in support of their claims to an Islamic constitu-
tion. Indeed, in many cases it might be said that there is a contradic-
tion between the state and Islamic trends. Examples of this contra-
diction are found in most of northern Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, Turkey, and all the Muslim countries of the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia. 
3. Islam and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The relationship between the governments mentioned in section 
two and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”) 
has always been somewhat ambivalent. During the drafting stage of 
the Declaration, Charles Malik, a Lebanese Christian, proposed in-
cluding in Article 18 the right to change one’s religion, traditionally 
prohibited in Islam.7 Saudi Arabia abstained because of this article 
and because of Article 16’s provision for equal rights in marriage. 
The only other abstentions in the vote in December 1948 were the 
U.S.S.R. and six other East European countries; Yemen was absent. 
No country voted against the Declaration. Despite voting in favor of 
the Declaration, the representatives of Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq,  
 
 
 7. ALBERT VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLARATION 
UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 177 (1964). 
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Pakistan, and Syria drew attention to the difficulties that Articles 16 
and 18 posed for Muslim countries.8 
4. Urbanization in Muslim countries provides support for Islamic 
political movements 
For the first three decades or so after the adoption of the Decla-
ration, the consolidation of the newly independent Muslim nation 
states was a political priority. In the context of the Cold War, the 
contrast between state systems (often constructed by revolutionary 
military regimes) and the Muslim character of the population was 
one of potential tension rather than one of common activity in the 
public space. It was not until the 1970s that this tension gained a 
higher profile in the process of social and economic change. The 
massive urbanization of Muslim countries everywhere, which took 
place in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, has often been the source of 
popular support for Islamic political movements.9 An important part 
of this modernization was the migration of Muslim people from the 
countryside to the city. Many of the children of these immigrants 
have gone into higher education and are forming a growing profes-
sional urban middle class. They and their parents came from a coun-
tryside that had only indirectly experienced the periods of seculariza-
tion and nationalism which characterized the 1920s to 1960s and 
which had mostly preserved its traditional way of life and outlook. 
For them, their Islamic foundations were not open to question. 
Rather, the question was how they could function in an Islamically 
appropriate fashion. Their education and intellectual capabilities 
helped this new middle class deal with this question, and they have 
become participants in a new, more self-confident exploration of 
how Islam and its Shari’ah can make sense in the modern world. It 
should be noted that in this exploration they share very directly with 
their cobelievers in Europe and parts of North America, who are 
usually also the children of the same process of migration from the 
countryside to the city.10 
 
 8. Id. at 181–82. 
 9. See, e.g., the later chapters in PETER MANSFIELD, A HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE 
EAST (1991), and NAZIH AYUBI, POLITICAL ISLAM: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE ARAB 
WORLD (1991). 
10.A forthcoming paper picks up the implications of this for Islamic thinking in Europe: 
PETER MANDAVILLE, TOWARDS A CRITICAL ISLAM: EUROPEAN MUSLIMS AND THE  
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5. Islamic organizations draw up their own human rights documents 
Amidst this period of growth and urbanization, Islam was in-
creasingly being challenged on its attitude toward human rights. In 
response to these challenges, Islamic organizations felt obliged to 
create their own Islamic human rights documents in such a way as to 
provide Islamic parallels to the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights. 
These documents tend to have an apologetic tone, indicating that 
the concept of human rights is now comfortably at home in an Is-
lamic environment and that human rights are rooted in Qur’anic 
principles. Large parts of these texts are reasonably consonant with 
recognized principles laid down in international documents such as 
the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights11 and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.12 In relation to the status of 
non-Muslims, the documents usually begin by citing the Qur’anic 
injunction that “There is no compulsion in religion” and then to 
guarantee to non-Muslims the right to freedom of belief and reli-
gious practice.13 
Among the most widely circulated of such declarations is the so-
called Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by 
the International Islamic Council in September 1981,14 which in-
cludes a freedom of religion provision in sections 10, 12a, and 13. 
However, the way in which the document has been presented and 
translated can only be termed devious. While the English text refers 
to rights “subject to the law,” the Arabic text is explicit that the law 
being referred to is actually the Shari’ah. The result is that a com-
paratively innocuous text in English becomes, in the Arabic original,  
 
CHANGING BOUNDARIES OF RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE (Stefano Allievi & Jorgen S. Nielsen 
eds.). 
 11. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
  12. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1953). 
 13. A comprehensive discussion of the attitude of the Qur’an specifically to Christians 
and how the relevant texts have been interpreted over the centuries may be found in JANE 
DAMMEN MCAULIFFE, QUR’ANIC CHRISTIANS: AN ANALYSIS OF CLASSICAL AND MODERN 
EXEGESIS (1991). 
 14. Both the English and the Arabic versions were published in pamphlet form by the 
Council’s office in London. The English version has been published online by the Al-Hewar 
Center at http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html (last visited May 1, 2002). The Ara-
bic version can be found in AL-HAQQ QADIM: WATHA’IQ HUQUQ AL-INSAN FI AL-
THAQAFAH AL-ISLAMIYYAH 143-56 (Ghanim Jawad ed. 2000). 
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a minefield of ambiguity to anyone but a traditionally inclined Mus-
lim reader. 
As Ann Mayer has pointed out, section 12a is particularly prob-
lematic. In its English version it confirms the right to expression of 
thought and belief “within the limits prescribed by the Law,” but 
limited by the prohibition of spreading slander, falsehood, and defa-
mation. The English text, however, does not include the prohibition 
of “leaving the [Muslim] ummah,” which is included in the Arabic 
text.15 
Other documents of this nature have been more hesitant in 
speaking of the religious rights of minorities. A draft Islamic consti-
tution published in 1979 by a committee of Islamic scholars linked 
to Al-Azhar University in Cairo merely spoke of providing “for the 
natural basic rights of religious and intellectual beliefs” within “the 
limits of the Islamic Shari’ah.”16 The 1990 Cairo Declaration of 
Human Rights in Islam, adopted by a foreign ministers’ meeting of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), avoids the ques-
tion of religious freedom and religious minorities altogether.17 
6. Building a foundation for human rights 
Some Islamic scholars themselves have been aware of the human 
rights problem and have been looking for ways to establish a con-
structive relationship between the Shari’ah and the world around 
them. It is probably no coincidence that the number of these schol-
ars has grown quickly in the last few decades. The rise of Islamic 
politics, whether in its Iranian form or in the revived family of trends 
around the Muslim brotherhood, has led to a political environment 
in many parts of the Muslim world in which participants have to take 
account of Islamic trends. Indeed, in some regions, such as Egypt, 
politics have become Islamic even when the state structures have not. 
This has allowed Islamic thinkers, scholars, and movements a grow-
ing self-confidence, permitting them to become more critical about 
their tradition. At the same time, this political revival has mobilized  
 
 15. ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 
160–61 (3d ed. 1999). 
 16. Id. at 162. 
 17. For the Arabic text, see AL-HAQQ QADIM, supra note 14. For an English transla-
tion, see MAYER, supra note 15, at 203–08. 
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an increasing number of intellectuals, both within the religious disci-
plines and without, to participate in the Islamic discourse. 
7. Non-Muslim minorities 
With regard to non-Muslim minorities, there are some scholars 
and activists who advocate the traditional practice of tolerating 
Christians and Jews18 as protected communities with specific rights, 
privileges, and duties. These scholars view such protection and tol-
eration as a favor towards communities that are in essence subju-
gated. Contemporary proponents of this tradition rightly point out 
that this treatment was far better than that which religious minorities 
generally experienced in Europe until the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
Other scholars have reformulated these traditional concepts into 
the language of modern state structures, the most well-known being 
the Pakistani founder of the Jama’at-i-Islami, Abu’l-A’la Maududi. 
In his view, many of the specific rights and duties of non-Muslims 
are no different from those of Muslims, including a degree of par-
ticipation in the political process. However, he insists that the Islamic 
state is an “ideological state” and that it is reasonable that only those 
who share that official ideology can fully participate in the state. 
Therefore, he concludes, public expressions of minority religion 
must be restricted.19 Nevertheless, members of the religious minori-
ties, along with a growing number of Muslim intellectuals engaged 
in rethinking the issue, insist that this subjugation of religious mi-
norities is not satisfactory in a modern society. It is the ideas of this 
group to which I now turn my attention. The next section will dis-
cuss the ideas of this third group. 
B. Literature Review of the State of Religious Minorities in Islam 
1. Historical introduction 
While this section will concentrate on authors who have pub-
lished during the 1990s, it would be a mistake to think that they do 
not have important predecessors. The great Shaykhs of Al-Azhar Is-
 
 18. Known also as “people of the book” (ahl al-kitab). 
 19. ABUL A'LA MAUDUDI, RIGHTS OF NON-MUSLIMS IN ISLAMIC STATE (Khurshid 
Ahmad trans., 1961). 
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lamic University in Cairo, Muhammad Abduh, and Mahmud Shaltut 
were among the leading thinkers to highlight the concept of citizen-
ship in the Islamic discourse in a way that forced people to pay atten-
tion.20 This discussion of the concept of “citizen” was shared with 
secular circles in an environment where the primary political ques-
tions were those of independence from imperial rule and then, in 
some countries, from autocratic monarchies. In the terms of the 
Egyptian secularist Khalid Muhammad Khalid, writing in the last 
year of the Egyptian monarchy, the struggle was for the liberation of 
the citizen (muwatin) from the status of subject (ri’aya).21 
Three decades later, another Egyptian, this time associated with 
the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Fahmi Howeidi, 
echoed Khalid’s title in his book, Muwatinun, la dhimmiyyun,22 this 
time juxtaposing the traditional status of protected community with 
the concept of citizenship. In the intervening period, of course, the 
context had seen some radical changes. The radical Arab nationalism 
of the 1950s and 1960s had failed in some crucial areas, particularly 
in relation to Israel. Both Syria and Iraq had suffered a series of mili-
tary coups, while the leading figure President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir of 
Egypt had suffered a number of setbacks, above all the defeat in the 
June 1967 War. In the aftermath of such disillusion, Islamic alterna-
tives to the secular state were beginning to acquire a new attractive-
ness. By the time Howeidi’s book appeared, the political initiative 
was very much in the Islamists’ court. The Islamic revolution had 
occurred in Iran, and Islamist radicals had assassinated President 
Anwar al-Sadat. Islamist parties were beginning to make inroads in 
those states where elections took place, and armed Islamic militant 
groups were appearing in a number of different countries. Howeidi’s 
book, written by someone better known as a journalist than a scholar 
(he was and is a leading columnist and deputy editor of Al-Ahram 
newspaper), was a sign that the internal Islamic debate was begin-
ning to open up. 
 
 20. See WILFORD CANTWELL SMITH, ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY ch. 3 (1957); 
GUDRUN KRÄMER, GOTTES STAAT ALS REPUBLIK chs. 1, 2, 6 (1999). 
 21. KHALID MUHAMMAD KHALID, MUWATINUN-LA RAAYA (6th ed. 1958); 
MU’ASSASAT AL-KHANJI (1st ed. 1958). The publication of the 1958 edition was no coinci-
dence: during this year the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown and widespread protests took place 
against the U.S.-led Baghdad Pact, the book was still relevant. 
 22. FAHMI HOWEIDI, MUWATINUN LA DHIMMIYUN (1985). 
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2. Views on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims 
In the years that followed the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, 
several other prominent Egyptian intellectuals associated with the 
moderate tendencies within the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to 
the Islamic debate, mostly through discussions of human rights and 
the political order. In 1989, Dr. Muhammad Salim al-’Awwa, a Brit-
ish-trained lawyer practicing in international civil law, published a 
discussion of the political ordering of the Islamic state.23 The basis of 
the state, he said, is the collective citizenship established by the 
Prophet Muhammad in the so-called Constitution of Medina, a citi-
zenship founded on a common commitment to the Prophet under 
God. This original community, the ummah, included the Jewish 
tribes of Medina. The classical and medieval scholars developed the 
jurisprudence of this community into the status of dhimmah for all 
peoples of the book by analogy with the Jews of Medina.24 
Al-’Awwa revisits the general question of relations between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims on the basis of Qur’an and Sunna (the prece-
dent set by the Prophet’s deeds and pronouncements preserved in 
the Hadith). The general principle espoused is to deal in a kindly and 
just manner with those, regardless of religion, who reciprocate such 
treatment.25 Verses in the Qur’an that detract from or contradict this 
principle, such as those which call for a jihad against non-believers or 
for them to be oppressed,26 only apply in specific circumstances. 
Events in the life of the Prophet are cited in support of this principle, 
and al-’Awwa concludes that Muslims are obliged to use their intel-
lect and reasoning (ijtihad) to ignore any rulings in the classical 
Shari’ah which contradict it.27 
Applying the argument to the present day, he asserts that the 
modern state represents a new kind of Islamic sovereignty to which 
much of traditional law cannot apply. Reasoning based on first prin-
ciples (ijtihad) must be used to deduce a new system. The modern 
Muslim state is the result of a common struggle for independence 
 
 23. MUHAMMAD SALIM AL-’AWWA, FI AL-NIZAM AL-SIYASI LI’L-DAWLAH AL-
ISLAMIYYAH (1989). 
 24. Id. at 55–57. A translation of the text of the “constitution” can be found in Ali Bu-
lac, The Medina Document, in LIBERAL ISLAM: A SOURCEBOOK 169–78 (Charles Kurzman 
ed., 1998). 
 25. Qur’an 60:8. 
 26. E.g., id. 9:29. 
 27. AL-’AWWA, supra note 23, at 248–55. 
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and nation building in which the Muslim majority and the non-
Muslim minority have shared. In this way it differs sharply from the 
early Muslim state that was based on conquest. In this situation it is 
the duty of the Muslim majority to concentrate on applying the prin-
ciples established by God and the Prophet rather than stubbornly in-
sisting on applying outdated and inappropriate rules. The discourse 
has changed from one of contract (‘aqd) to one of constitution (dus-
tur) and from dhimmah to citizenship (muwatanah).28 
An older but close colleague of al-’Awwa, Ahmad Kamal Abu al-
Magd, was moved by the growing tension between the Egyptian re-
gime and Islamic political extremism to issue a declaration of princi-
ples in 1991.29 The following year a second printing included a fore-
word responding to comments to the first printing.30 One particular 
point to which he felt called to respond was the fear expressed by 
Christian commentators that his insistence on majority rule would 
marginalize the Christians, given the overwhelming Muslim majority 
in the population of Egypt.31 His first point, in response, is that the 
dhimmah was a historical expression of rights and duties guaranteed 
in the founding documents of Islam, namely Qur’an and Sunna, and 
that the conditions originally necessary for the institution of dhim-
mah are no longer present. He reaffirms his belief expressed in the 
original declaration that it is possible to write a modern constitution 
which gives full religious freedom and civil rights to all, Muslim or 
not. Therefore, according to Abu al-Magd, the rights of non-
Muslims in a modern Islamic state would be guaranteed in constitu-
tional texts that have the highest legal standing and would be fully in 
consonance with the Shari’ah. 
The concept of majority rule is, of course, one that arises out of 
the western democratic experience. Abu al-Magd posits that the fears 
that Christians have expressed are based on an assumption that relig-
ion is the primary line of division within society, a fear that has come 
about because of the hard-line Islamic movements that seek to im-
pose their fossilized concept of Shari’ah. A constitution that is con-
 
 28. Id. at 257–63. 
 29. AHMAD KAMAL ABU AL-MAGD, RU’YA ISLAMIYYAH MU’ASARAH: I’LAN MABADI’ 
(1991). In fact, the original declaration had been circulated for private discussion already in 
1981. 
 30. AHMAD KAMAL ABU AL-MAGD, RU’YA ISLAMIYYAH MU’ASARAH: I’LAN MABADI’ 
(2nd prtg. 1992). 
 31. Id. at 15-18. 
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sistent with this position would guarantee the equal rights of all citi-
zens and should thus alleviate the understandable fears of non-
Muslims. 
A few years later, another Egyptian, Muhammad ‘Imara, who 
was closer to the center of the Muslim Brotherhood than the two 
previous writers, asked whether Islam was the solution. This question 
echoed the slogan of the Islamic radicals: “Islam is the solution.”32 
‘Imara also referred to the “constitution” of Medina, which, within 
the shared community/ummah, has space for religious pluralism.33 
Communities and states are founded on a shared belonging. In the 
case of the Islamic state, the priority of this belonging is Islam, 
within which there is no problem with a plurality of lesser belong-
ings, including family, tribe, ethnic group, locality, etc.34 This be-
longing, says ‘Imara, includes non-Muslims in the Muslim world. 
The difference between them is that while for the Muslims the be-
longing includes “creed, Shari’ah, values, civilization, nationality, 
country, culture, history, and heritage,” the belonging for the non-
Muslim does not include a shared creed or Shari’ah; they have their 
own.35 Islam, he says, represents their shared belonging and brings 
together the peoples and nations of the ummah with their differing 
beliefs and forms of worship. In fact, the Constitution of Medina dis-
tinguishes between ummah as a religious community and ummah as 
a political community, citing the status of Jews as an analogy. In a 
direct comparison with Christians and Christianity, he asserts that 
the Islamicness of a Muslim majority state is an essential requirement 
in a way that the “Christianness” of a Christian majority state is not. 
The implementation of Shari’ah does not detract from the Chris-
tianness of Christian minorities, but its absence would fatally flaw Is-
lam.36 
Perhaps one of the most influential Arab Islamic political writers 
outside Egypt during the 1980s was Rashid al-Ghannushi, the now-
exiled leader of the Islamic opposition in Tunisia. In a series of ser-
mons delivered in 1984 at the Burj al-Rumi mosque in Tunis, he 
 
 32. MUHAMMAD ‘IMARA, HAL AL-ISLAM HUWA AL-HALL? (1995). 
 33. Id. at 53-54. 
 34. Id. at 162-63. 
 35. Interestingly, this is a view which is mirrored in an earlier generation of Christian, 
mostly Byzantine Orthodox, Arab nationalist thinkers. See A. HOURANI, ARABIC THOUGHT IN 
THE LIBERAL AGE: 1798-1939, 309-11 (1962). 
 36. ‘IMARA, supra note 32, at 170-73. 
NIE-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:24 PM 
353] Religious Minorities in Islam 
 365 
outlined his thoughts on citizenship and the rights of non-Muslims 
in Muslim society.37 He bases his arguments on a few key Qur’anic 
verses, the most basic of which is Surah 16:90: “God commands jus-
tice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids 
all shameful deeds and injustice and rebellion.” Quoting the medie-
val commentator al-Razi, Ghannushi says that all the rest of the 
Qur’an is a commentary and explanation (tafsir) of this verse. The 
first four sermons deal with his understanding of justice (‘adl). On 
this foundation he then enters into a detailed discussion of the rights 
of non-Muslims, where the key Qur’anic verses are 49:13 (“O peo-
ple, We created you male and female, and made you peoples and 
tribes, that you might know each other”) and 2:256 (“There is no 
compulsion in religion: truth stands out clearly from error”). In the 
face of much traditional commentary, Ghannushi emphasizes that 
this last verse appeared towards the very end of the period of revela-
tion during the lifetime of the Prophet and must therefore be re-
garded as a general injunction taking precedent over the number of 
more inimical statements that related only to specific events and cir-
cumstances.38 On this basis, Ghannushi joins the previous authors in 
relegating the status of dhimmah to a past history that is no longer 
relevant39 before proceeding to deal with the various practical impli-
cations. There is broad agreement with the other authors that non-
Muslims have equal political and civil rights, including full rights of 
employment, even within the government, except in posts with reli-
gious content. On the issue of the jizyah (a poll tax incumbent on 
non-Muslims according to classical rulings), Ghannushi takes the 
view that the Qur’anic statement that it should be collected “with 
submission” (9:29) is linked to one particular event. The crucial 
element is that it is paid in lieu of military service, and as the modern 
state is one of shared citizenship, it is more appropriate for all to 
share that duty. In which case the requirement to pay the jizyah falls 
away.40 
Professor Syed Z. Abedin took a different approach in dealing 
with the contemporary challenge to the traditional Islamic views. 
 
 37. RASHID AL-GHANNUSHI, HUQUQ AL-MUWATANA: HUQUQ GHAYR AL-MUSLIM FI 
AL-MUJTAMA’ AL-ISLAMI (International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, VA 1993) 
(1989). 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 65-75. 
 40. Id. at 99-103. 
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Trained in social science and being of Indian origin, Professor Abe-
din was the founder of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, an institution that had the quiet but active 
support of the then General Secretary of the Muslim World League, 
Dr. Umar Abdallah Nasif.41 In an article published just a decade ago, 
Professor Abedin places the Qur’anic concept of “the people of the 
book” (i.e. Christians and Jews) into the exegetical context of what 
he identifies as a Qur’anic distinction between religion as din and as 
shir’a.42 The former term, often translated “faith” or “religion,” 
represents the eternal divine absolutes and truths that are revealed at 
various times and various places into particular contexts. There they 
acquire the trappings of the limitations of the created, finding ex-
pression in the circumstances of time and place, “hence multiple 
ways of life . . . i.e. religious and cultural plurality among man-
kind.”43 Shir’a is then the term which applies to such ways of life. Is-
lamic scholars have also dealt with apostasy. 
One topic that most such intellectuals tend to avoid is the sensi-
tive matter of conversion away from Islam—apostasy (riddah)—
whose traditional punishment according to the vast majority of the 
texts is death. However, there are different views on this topic. An 
increasingly common argument is that the traditional judgment was 
determined by the conditions in early and classical Islam. Reading 
the Qur’an and Sunnah allows for an understanding of riddah that is 
essentially akin to the concept of treason. In modern society and 
state, apostasy, understood simply as a turning away of faith from Is-
lam, has become an issue separate from treason. This was reflected in 
the conclusions of a 1976 meeting of Christian and Muslim theolo-
gians discussing mission and da’wah (the Muslim equivalent to 
Christian mission) which accepted the legitimacy of the “right to 
convince and to be convinced.”44 While not widely referred to, the 
significance of this statement lies in the identity of some of those 
 
 41. Dr. Nasif subsequently spent some years as the first deputy president of the new 
Saudi Shura, often seen as an embryo national parliament. The Institute continues to publish a 
journal, Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, although after the first few issues, 
the publication had to be moved from Jeddah to London. 
 42. Syed Z. Abedin, Al-Dhimma: The Non-Believer’s Identity in Islam, 3 ISLAM AND 
CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL., 40-57 (1992). 
 43. Id. at 50. 
 44. 65 INT’L REV. OF MISSION (Oct. 1976), reprinted by the Islamic Foundation under 
the title CHRISTIAN MISSION AND ISLAMIC DA’WAH (1982). 
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Muslims who participated and agreed to the text, most notably Pro-
fessor Khurshid Ahmad, a leading member of the Jama’at-i-Islami of 
Pakistan and later its deputy leader. More recently it has been ex-
pounded in strong and explicit terms from an unexpected quarter, 
namely Dr. Hassan al-Turabi of Sudan, in an interview with Al-
Mustakillah newspaper in which he opposes Ayatullah al-Khumayni’s 
fatwa against Salman Rushdie: 
If Almighty Allah has granted us the merit of freedom, he who 
wants to believe is allowed that right and so too the one who wants 
to disbelieve. If He has chosen to distinguish us from other crea-
tures through His gift of freedom, instead of creating us believers 
by necessity like stones, mountains and the earth . . . then the exer-
cise of that freedom will become a matter of course—a self-evident 
truth confirmed by the Qur’an as in, “No-one is compelled to be-
lieve.”45  
One question that cannot be avoided in relation to such trends 
among Islamic scholars and thinkers is the degree of relevance they 
have to the practical and legal situation in Muslim countries. This is 
not a matter relating only to the status of non-Muslims. As Ann 
Mayer has pointed out, bans on apostasy are more likely to be used 
against fellow Muslims than against those who convert to another 
religion: “[P]rofessing Muslims may be prosecuted as heretics or 
blasphemers for what is actually political or theological dissent or 
may be arbitrarily declared apostates and executed.”46 The experience 
of the Pakistani law on blasphemy supports this analysis, as does the 
renowned case of the Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, 
whose marriage a Cairo court dissolved on the grounds that he was 
allegedly an apostate.47 
The answer to this question can only be given with reference to 
individual countries and will usually depend on the local political 
situation as much as on anything else. The degree to which the re-
gime is under pressure from Islamist groups, as well as the balance of 
power between different Islamist trends, has a major part to play in 
determining the effects of bans on apostasy. 
 
 45. [2:256] English translation in THE DIPLOMAT 38-39 (June 1996). 
 46. MAYER, supra note 15, at 174. 
 47. Abu Zayd supplies a sharp attack on what some people have called the ‘intellectual 
terrorism’ mobilized against him in this case. AL-TAFKIR FI ZAMAN AL-TAKFIR (Sina, Cairo) 
(1995). 
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A longer-term factor is the nature of the Islamic instruction that 
is provided in schools and the nature of training in Islamic religious 
scholarship offered in the Islamic faculties of the universities around 
the region, the latter usually training the teachers who provide the 
former. While much of the university training remains traditional, 
there are signs of change. Nevertheless, this is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Discussion of the issues outlined above has not remained isolated 
in small groups of enthusiasts. Most recently it has found unusually 
strong expression in the form of an “Arab Muslim-Christian cove-
nant” entitled Dialogue and Coexistence. The text of this document, 
nearly three years in preparation, was finalized at a large, highly pub-
licized meeting in Cairo in December 2001. Participants included 
scholars, writers, and religious functionaries covering a wide and ecu-
menical spectrum of both Christians and Muslims from the Arab 
world. Press and political response to the document ranged from 
positive to enthusiastic. I can think of no better way to end this pa-
per than by including a few key excerpts from the document: 
5. The Arab Working Group on Dialogue observes that the effort 
to give firm foundation to a sense of coexistence is mandated by 
shared national and social concerns and aims, by a single historical 
and cultural process, and by a sense of common destiny. These are 
core issues that bring everyone together. The duties, rights and 
consequences they imply are not the domain of just one faction. 
Religious differences do not cancel out the fact of belonging all to-
gether to the Arab Islamic culture, in whose making Christians and 
Muslims participated side by side. 
6. [The Working Group] sees the strengthening national unity as 
imperative. Sensitive to how external intervention can precipitate 
internal unrest that can take on a religious coloration, it is not right 
to make light of how internal factors and circumstances can be ma-
nipulated and exploited by foreign powers to serve their own inter-
ests.  
The citizens of the united nation, both Muslim and Christian, must 
join in dialogue and work together to address internal issues and to 
solve the problems they raise. This is the prerequisite to frustrating 
foreign interference that only aggravates the situation and nurtures 
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suspicions and mutual fear. But if making light of how internal 
problems can inflict great damage on national unity, so too making 
too much of them can provoke similar damage. Among Muslim 
and Christian citizens of one nation, exaggerations can foster a 
generalized atmosphere of panic, fear and self-isolation.  
. . . . 
11. Lack of respect for cultural and religious distinctiveness and the 
poor management of pluralism in Arab societies has, to some extent 
and in specific countries, restricted areas in which Muslims and 
Christians can intermingle, join with each other, meet, work to-
gether and cooperate. This restriction has affected residential dis-
tricts, educational institutions (especially private ones), professional, 
cultural and political institutions, and clubs. The effect of this has 
been to weaken the institutions of civil society that ought to be a 
uniting force for the national body politic. Addressing this, the dia-
logue envisioned by the working group strives to foster full citizen-
ship and participation in public life freed from the shackles of con-
fessionalism that, by their nature, undermine national unity, open 
doors to foreign interference and obstruct democratic develop-
ment.48 
 
 48. The full text in Arabic and English is available from the Middle East Council of 
Churches at jarjour@spidernet.com.cy, available at http://www.mecchurches.org/ 
posandpress/ (last visited May 1, 2002). 
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